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Abstract: Bernard Williams blames Kant’s morality for a crucial 
flaw in contemporary ethics. In Problems of the Self, he claims that 
British philosophers limit themselves to acknowledging emotions as 
a potentially destructive component for morality and consistency.1 In 
opposition to it, he struggles to dismiss several Kantian views about 
emotions, such as the one according to which emotions are supposed 
to be only a product of natural causation, as well as too capricious and 
passively experienced. I shall show that Kant has a place for emotions 
in his moral theory. However, he asserts that we can act morally without 
any sensible incentive. I show that Williams and Kant have different 
models concerning moral motivation and that Kant does not agree with 
Williams’ claim that “Only motivations motivate”, since moral law could 
trigger a moral action without any sensible motive. 
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Resumo: Bernard Williams critica a moral kantiana como responsável 
por uma falha crucial da ética contemporânea. Em Problemas do Eu, 
ele afirma que os filósofos ingleses limitam-se a reconhecer as emoções 
como um componente potencialmente destrutivo da moralidade . 
Opondo-se a isto, ele tenta refutar várias visões de Kant sobre emoções, 
de acordo com as quais as emoções seriam apenas um produto de uma 
causa natural, além de volúveis e experimentadas de forma passiva. 
Mostrarei que Kant tem um lugar para as emoções na sua teoria moral; 
entretanto, ele defende que podemos agir moralmente sem nenhum 
móbil sensível. Pretendo provar que Bernard Williams e Kant possuem 
diferentes modelos de motivação moral e que Kant não concorda com 
a expressão de Williams “apenas motivações motivam”, visto que a 
lei moral poderia levar a uma ação, sem a necessidade de um motivo 
sensível.
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In the article “Kant and Motivational Externalism”, Karl Ameriks 
insists that “if a Kantian still wishes to reach a truly cosmopolitan 
audience, it makes sense to step back beyond the perspective of 
Kantian scholarship alone, and to reflect on the basic features that 
contemporary philosophers would insist that any acceptable theory 
treat with sensibility”.2 Commentators have been tempted to follow this 
Humean trend and find out sensible incentives in Kant. I will go back to 
Kant’s texts, in order to locate where we can find sensibility or sensitivity 
and in which sense these feelings are necessary to action. Can we act 
morally without any sensible incentives?
For a traditional reader of the Critique of Pure Reason the answer is 
unequivocally “yes”. Kant is explicitly about this possibility in:
The human power of choice is indeed an arbitrium sensitivum, yet not 
brutum but liberum, because sensibility does not render its action 
necessary, but in the human being, there is a faculty of determining 
oneself from oneself, independent of necessitation by sensible impulses. 
(KrV, A 534/ B562A)3
In the Groundwork, the answer seems to be also positive. Not only 
one can, but one should act without any moral feeling. Sympathy4 for 
other people’s fortune, as a feeling that leads to beneficence, is analyzed 
in the well known example of the Groundwork. When explaining the 
difference between acting from duty and according to duty, Kant presents 
the example of two philanthropists, distinguishing the one that possess 
a close pleasure in spreading joy to his fellow humans beings from the 
one who helps other people out of duty: 
Suppose, then, that the mind of this philanthropist were overclouded by 
his own grief, which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of the others,  
2  Ameriks, K. “Kant and motivational externalism”. In: Klemme. Moralische motivation. 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2006.
3  I will use the following abbreviations: KrV for Critique of Pure Reason, G for Groundwork, 
DV for Doctrine of Virtue, Ant for Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , MS for 
The Metaphysics of Morals , KpV for the Critique of Practical Reason. The numbers refer 
to volume and page (AA volume: page) of the Academy Edition (Kant’s gesammelte 
Schriften, 27 volumes. Königlichen Preußischen (later Deutschen) Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900-). The Critique of Pure Reason refers to A 
or B edition. I will be using the translations of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (editors).
4  I take sympathy as translation for Teilnehmung, instead of compassion. Affekt will be 
translated by affect, while Leidenschaft by passion. I will reserve emotions for a generic 
term that denotes moral feelings, affection and passions.
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troubles did not move him because he had enough to do with his own; 
and suppose that now, when no longer incited to it by any inclination, 
he nevertheless tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does 
the action without any inclination, simply from duty. (G,AA 4:398).
Kant also asks if we should not consider that his action would have a 
higher worth if nature had put little sympathy in his heart, and the answer 
is negative: “By all means! It is just then that the worth of character 
comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest, namely, that 
he is beneficent not from inclination but from duty.” (G: AA 4: 399).
We can clearly distinguish in the example of the two philanthropists 
an action done according to duty from an action done from duty: the 
first one is carried out of compassion and the second one is performed 
even if the philanthropist does not care about other peoples’ misery. 
The difference between one and another is that the incentive of the 
first one is sympathy, which is a sensible inclination, while the action of 
second philanthropist is performed by the respect to the moral law. Kant 
considers that, if compassion for the other people’s luck is the incentive 
of an action, then this action does not have a true moral value. If we 
consider this example in the light of the history of the Philosophy, we 
see that it is clearly provocative. To affirm that the benevolent action of a 
man who is not touched by the other people’s misery does not have any 
moral value obviously emphasizes the difference between Kant and the 
empiricists, such as Hume and Hutcheson, who attribute to the natural 
feelings of sympathy the role of a virtuous incentive of moral actions.5
Despite the example of philanthropist in the Groundwork, which 
clearly indicates that the mere presence of moral feelings makes an 
action without moral value, the mere presence of some feelings, such as 
sympathy, does not make an action morally unworthy, had he respect 
for moral law been a sufficient incentive for the accomplishment of the 
action. This thesis is corroborated by the difference that Kant establishes 
between utility and moral feeling. In the Groundwork, when analyzing 
the role played by moral feeling in Hutcheson’s philosophy, Kant argues 
that this feeling is closer to morality than the principle of utility that 
only teaches us how to calculate better. Despite the fact that they are 
both empirical principles and do not give us the necessary pureness and   
5  Hume also doubts the existence of a creature, in which, sympathy was completely 
absent, which he calls a “monster of fancy”. “It can be said that it does not have such 
a human creature, for whom the happiness of the others did not provoke pleasure 
(where it did not have place for envy or revenge), and the appearance of suffering, pain”. 
Hume, D. An essay concerning the principles of morals. Indianopolis: Hacket Publishing 
Company, 1983, p. 52.
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to morality:
On the other hand, moral feeling- this supposed special sense, 
nevertheless remains closer to morality and its dignity inasmuch as 
it shows virtue the honor of ascribing to her immediately the delight 
and esteem we have for her and does not, as it were, tell her to her face 
that it is not her beauty but only our advantage that attaches us to her. 
(G, AA 4:443)
But from the fact that Kant prefers moral feeling to utility as a 
reason for moral action does not follow that he claims moral feelings are 
necessary conditions to moral actions. Both in the Groundwork and in 
the Critique of the Practical Reason, the necessity to support morality 
in a non-material practical principle leads, obviously, to the refusal to 
ascribe the role of moral incentives to feelings such as love, benevolence 
and affection. 
The aim of the Critique of Practical Reason is to prove, at least the 
possibility of practical reason, that is, that reason can be capable to drive 
us to act morally, in spite of the good or bad feelings we have. To prove 
that pure reason can be practical is to prove that it can, alone, determine 
the will. We would fail to prove it, if the will was always dependant 
on empirical conditions. If the will was always based on feelings or 
passions, this would mean that the pure reason cannot be practical and 
that the causality of freedom is impossible. The Groundwork, as well as 
the Critique of Practical Reason, has the aim to obtain, respectively, the 
categorical imperative and the moral law, in an attempt to prove that 
reason can determine the will, without the help of empirical incentives. 
In this context, Kant is critical to ascribe the role of a moral incentive to 
benevolent feelings, since these would be empirical and contingent, not 
being able to be taken as a ground for the determination of the will. In 
these texts, Kant states clearly that a feeling is a subjective incentive, 
being inappropriate for the establishment of morality and its foundation 
upon reason.
In the Doctrine of Virtue, however, Kant surprises us with the 
claim that there are some feelings which are subjective conditions of 
receptiveness of the concept of duty (MS, AA 6:399). These are moral 
feeling, conscience, love of human beings and self-respect. Moral feeling 
is defined as “the susceptibily to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from 
being aware that our actions are consistent or contrary to the law of 
duty.” (MS, 6: 399). This feeling can be pathological or moral: pathological 
if it “precedes the representation of the law”, moral if it “can only follow 
upon it.” (MS, AA 6:399). Moral feeling seems to be a product of the 
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morally. However, Kant is ambiguous when he claims that moral feeling 
is not a sense for the morally good, but a susceptibility on the part of free 
choice to be moved by pure practical reason. He also asserts that “No 
human being is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely 
lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally dead”. Here it seems 
that the answer to our question whether one can act morally without 
moral feelings is negative, although it does not imply that moral feelings 
precede the moral action and act as incentives. 
What could be the role of moral feeling, if it is not an incentive? Moral 
feeling can be understood as a satisfaction through the understanding, 
as a pleasure in the concept of moral law. As Kant writes in the Nachlaß, 
1020:
The causa impulsive is either an impression or a concept, a representation 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction through senses or the understanding, of 
the agreeable or the good: The first impel per stimulus, the second per 
motive. The arbitrium immediate determinatum per stimulus is brutum. 
(…) The motive intellectualia pura are what pleases immediately in the 
concept, now this is nothing other than a good will, since everything 
else can only please conditionally as a means. (AA 15: 456)
The pleasure in the concept of moral law is necessary for human 
beings to be affected by the concept of a good will; however, it is not an 
incentive for moral actions 
2  Sympathy, benevolence and the duty to love
The same affection that does not have any intrinsic moral value in 
the Groundwork, come out in the Doctrine of the Virtue as a feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure that should be used to promote benevolence, 
being itself an incentive for moral actions:
Sympathetic joy and sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings 
of pleasure and displeasure (which are therefore to be called ‘aesthetic’ 
at another s state of joy or pain (shared feelings, sympathetic feeling). 
Nature has already implanted in human beings receptivity to these 
feelings. But to use this as a means to promoting active and rational 
benevolence is still a particular, though only a conditional, duty. 
(MS, AA 6:456)
In this quotation, Kant explicitly admits the possibility of using the 
feeling of sympathy as an incentive, a way to activate benevolent actions. 
More than that, to use sensible feelings is a duty called humanity. It seems 
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the role of feelings as incentives. Does Kant change his mind about the 
role of feelings in the later texts, such as the Doctrine of the Virtue (1797)? 
A provisory answer can be found on the remark he makes about the duty 
of humanity: “It is called the duty of humanity (humanitas) because a 
human being is regarded here not merely as a rational being but also 
as an animal endowed by reason” (MS, AA 6: 457). Kant admits that a 
Doctrine of the Virtue, as part of a Metaphysics of Morals, should be built 
upon a system of concepts, which are independent of empirical intuitions:
A philosophy of any subject (a system of rational cognition from concepts) 
requires a system of pure rational concepts independent of any conditions 
of intuition, that is, a metaphysics. (MS, AA 6:375)
The philosopher who wants to construct a Metaphysics of Morals 
looks for rational pure concepts, unconstrained by empirical conditions. To 
be faithful to the spirit of the Metaphysics of Morals, it should be possible 
that the Doctrine of the Virtue gives us a system of rational pure concepts. 
Although in the Preface of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly states 
that morality cannot be based on empirical feelings, here we come across 
the duty to love as a first chapter (Of the duty to love other men) of the 
first section, of the second part (Of the duties of virtue in relation to other 
men) of the Doctrine of the Virtue.
A Metaphysics of Morals intends to build a system of duties, which 
are free from pathological feelings. In this context, how can we have a 
duty to love? Another problem that occurs here is the possibility of a priori 
construction that leads to a theory of virtue, since virtue is usually defined 
as habits that belongs to the empirical domain. Aristotle defines virtue 
as a héxis proairetiké, that is, a habit to act deliberately. If we accept this 
definition, a theory of the virtues would belong to the technical-practical 
domain. But Kant seems to look for a way to establish a Metaphysics of 
Morals in the pure practical domain. It that really the case? 
To answer to this question, it will be necessary to correctly 
understand the conception of a Metaphysics of Morals, as that doctrine 
that contains in it principles of application of the universal law to 
the “particular nature of the human beings, which is only known by 
experience.” (MS, AA 6:217). The other side of the Metaphysics of 
Morals is a practical Anthropology, which gives the conditions to the 
acceptance or rejection of the moral law by human beings. This does 
not mean, Kant claims, “that a Metaphysics of Morals must be based 
on an anthropology”, but “that it must be applied to this.” (MS, 6:217). 
In the Groundwork, Kant clearly distinguishes between a Metaphysics 
of Morals, that presents “the laws in accordance to which everything 
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in accordance to which everything happens.” (G, 4:388). Twelve years 
later, however, the idea of a Metaphysics of Morals includes in itself 
an empirical knowledge on the nature of human beings, without which 
it would not be possible to determine a concrete system of duties for 
the human beings. Allen Wood correctly analyzes this displacement 
in the conception of Metaphysics of Morals that occurs between 1785 
and 1797, regarding the separation between the empirical and pure 
part of the ethics.6
According to him, when Kant alters the content of a Metaphysics of 
Morals in order to encompass the empirical nature of human beings, he 
is not abandoning or modifying its basic thesis, that the basic principle 
of morality is total a priori. He is only restricting its previous thesis that 
a Metaphysics of Morals is only related to the ideas and principles of a 
possible pure will. In other words, Kant does not consider anymore that a 
Metaphysics of Morals is composed only of a set of pure moral principles, 
but it is a system of duties that result when the pure moral principle is 
applied to the empirical nature of the man. 
The application of the pure moral principle to the empirical nature 
of the man gives us a system of virtues, defined as ends that are at the 
same time, duties. Kant enumerates two ends that should be considered 
as duties: self- perfection and other people’s happiness. These two ends 
lead to two different types of duties: the duties of man related to him, and 
duties related to others, among which we find the duty to love, which 
consists in promoting the happiness of others. However, this virtuous 
love is not a love related to the pleasure experienced in the presence of 
other person, but it is a principle to do benevolent actions:
In this context, however, love is not to be understood as feeling, that is, 
as a pleasure in the perfection of others, love is not to be understood 
as delight in them (since others cannot put one under obligation to 
have feelings). It must rather be thought as the maxim of benevolence 
(practical love), which results in beneficence. (DV, AA 6:449)
By the duty to love, Kant means, not the love of delight (love 
complacentiae), but the love of benevolence (Wohlwollen, love 
benevolentiae), since the latter could be demanded from someone, but not 
the former, given that it would be a contradiction that somebody should 
have the obligation to feel pleasure. The love of benevolence, since it is not 
a feeling of pleasure, admits something near an Aristotelian cultivation, 
disposition that can be awaken by habit. Kant writes:
6  Wood, A. Kant’s Ethical thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 196.
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that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means 
of this love to do good to him. It means, rather, to do good to your fellow 
human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as 
an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general. (DV, AA 6:402)
For this reason, Kant distinguishes the virtue of love from the love 
in which one feels pleasure or satisfaction. Moreover, we cannot have a 
duty to love, if love was understood as a feeling or pleasure, because a 
duty cannot constraint someone to neither have pathological feelings, 
nor can moral law induces someone to love somebody.
The duty to love must be understood as a principle of benevolence, 
which consists, not in wanting the good of the others without practically 
contributing for this, but in a practical benevolence, or beneficence, that 
consists in consider the good of the others as end in it. The benevolence 
principle will produce, in turn, the duties of beneficence (to help the 
needed ones to find their happiness) and of recognition (to honor a person 
due to a favor that was received) and of affection (Teilnehmung). Kant 
accepts that to participate in the pain or joy of the others is, without a 
doubt, a feeling, apparently falling again, in a material determination for 
morality. The introduction of this feeling of sympathy must be, however, 
interpreted, not as a ground of determination for the action, but as a 
natural feeling that we must use in order to accomplish benevolent 
actions. It will be our duty, therefore, to cultivate in us those sympathetic 
feelings, although the moral law should not be based on that, but on the 
pure reason. 
In the Doctrine of the Virtue, Kant presents a more complex moral 
theory on the role of the feelings related to moral actions. Even though 
sympathy can be an incentive to the accomplishment of a moral action (or 
an incitement to the practical love), this does not mean that all the sharing 
of feelings are positive. We can see it in the division of the humanity in 
humanitas practica, “the capacity and the will to share in others’ feelings” 
and humanitas aesthetica, “the receptivity, given by nature itself, to the 
feel of joy and sadness in common with others.” (DV, AA 6:456). The first 
one is desirable, but not the second, because the first one is free and 
depends on the will, while the second is spread among people “as the 
susceptibility to heat or the contagious diseases.” (DV, AA 6:457).
The reason of praising the humanitas practica and disapproving 
the humanitas aesthetica is that compassion, when not followed by a 
practical action, is a form to increase the evil in the world. If a friend is 
suffering and I cannot make nothing to diminish his pain, I do not have 
such a duty of being sympathetic to his feelings, because this would only 
make me increase the suffering and troubles of the world.
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role of moral incentive, when the representation of the duty by itself 
will not be enough, “for this is still one of the impulses that nature has 
implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not 
accomplish.” (DV, AA 6:458). The feeling of sympathy is added to a moral 
incentive (respect) to accomplish the moral action. If the representation 
of the law will not be enough to bring about the action, it is a duty to 
promote our natural good feelings to add a natural incentive to a rational 
moral one. Going, therefore, beyond the spirit of the Groundwork, Kant 
admits that sympathy, duly cultivated to answer to the correct situations, 
can be the incentive of a moral action that is carried through by the motive 
of duty. In this case, this duty must be understood in two levels: first, one 
to carry out moral actions; second, a derived duty to use natural feelings 
when the consideration about the moral correction of the action is not 
enough to start the action.
The role that Kant attributes to sympathy is, therefore, of a provisory 
moral feeling, which can assist in the accomplishment of good actions, 
when the feeling of respect for the moral law is not yet enough developed. 
As Nancy Sherman analyzes, this is a morality faute de mieux, that is, a 
type of provisory morality: it is a morality of inferior type, an immature 
morality that finally will be substituted in the progress of the individual. 
Nancy Sherman, however, admits that feelings such as sympathy, 
compassion and love possess a perceptive moral role in Kant, that is, 
that “we still need the pathological emotions to decide where and when 
these ends (of the moral law and its spheres of justice and the virtue) 
are appropriate”.7
Sherman seems to be correct and faithful to the texts when she 
examines the provisory role of feelings such as compassion, love, affection, 
since Kant really admits a function for these in the accomplishment of 
the moral actions, when the mere respect for the law will not be strong 
enough to trigger the action. The perceptive role, however, is more 
doubtful, since the idea that emotions are blind seems to remain a 
constant in the Kantian work, without variations from the Groundwork to 
the Doctrine of the Virtue. The critique of sympathy as a possible incentive 
for a moral action was based, in the case of the philanthropist, not in the 
absence of contempt for sympathy in itself, but in the idea that sympathy, 
for itself, could not show us which course of action is the moral one. A 
good example given in the contemporary literature is supplied by Barbara 
Herman: we hear somebody crying out for aid to load something heavy, 
7  Sherman, N. “The place of emotions in Kantian morality”. In: Flanagan, & the Rorty. 
Identity, character and morality, Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1990, p. 149-170, p. 159.
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art museum was stolen by a thief. In this example, one ended helping a 
thief to carry on his misdemeanor. And this was done out of sympathy. 
In the Doctrine of Virtue, sympathy can play a role of a moral incentive, 
if it is trained and controlled by the will, which will also inform when this 
feeling must be activated. This is the reason why humanity is divided 
in free and non-free humanity. The free humanity (humanitas practica) 
is the capacity and the will to use the feeling of sympathy to promote 
the happiness of others, which includes a procedure to decide in which 
cases I must set in motion these feeling. A stoic that decides that he will 
not set in motion his feelings of sympathy, acts in such a way, because 
he knows he cannot do anything to help his friend; however, if he had 
something practical that he could do, he would activate his feelings of 
compassion, since these would have as consequence a real beneficent 
action. Consequently, in this new vision of sympathy presented in the 
Doctrine of the Virtue, this feeling is of possible controlling by reason, 
what disagrees with the negative approach of sympathy presented 
in the Groundwork, that is confirmed by the of Mrongovius notes on 
Anthropology (84/85) According to such notes, one of the reasons 
that sympathy, are inappropriate as an incentive is its sensible 
register: “if [sympathy with the joy and pain] becomes an affect, then 
the human being becomes unhappy. The human being becomes, through 
sympathy, only sensible and he does not help the others.” (AntMrongovius, 
AA 25:1348).
 So, in order to make sympathy effective and turn it into beneficence, 
one should go to hospitals and other places, in order to see the suffering 
other people’s; it is a duty, says Kant “not to avoid the places where the 
poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found but rather to 
seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtors’ prisons and so forth 
in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist.” 
(DV, AA 6:457). This habitus does not aim at developing compassionate 
personalities, but at training our feelings of compassion and sympathy so 
that they can be used as a means to accomplish good actions. However, 
the feelings of love, sympathy and compassion are, in themselves, morally 
blind, depending on moral principles to be set in motion in the correct 
situation.
3  Desire, affect and passion: the anthropologic modalities of love.
In the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view (1798), Kant 
presents his division of faculties: the faculty of knowledge, the faculty 
of pleasure and the faculty of desire. In his division, affects, appetites 
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and displeasure, either to the faculty to desire. To the faculty to desire 
belong the instincts, propensities, inclinations and passions (Ant, 
AA 7:265); affects belong to the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure.
A first and primitive level of love could be attributed to instinct, 
second division of the faculty to desire. The mating instinct is common to 
human beings and animals, and sexual desire in itself does not possess 
anything related to morality or to the promotion of dignity. In the Doctrine 
of the Right, Kant defines the sexual union as a use that a human being 
makes of the sexual capacities of the other; “in this act”, he claims, “a 
human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right of 
humanity.” (MS, AA 6:278). The only way to restitute his personality is to 
possess the other equally as a thing. The difference between prostitution 
and marriage consists in the fact that marriage preserves the right of 
humanity only by adding the contractual aspect, that of the right to use 
the other in turn. Both husband and wife have the right to use their sexual 
capacities, and they also have the exclusive right to use them. This is 
not the case, for instance, in prostitution. That is the one of the reasons 
why Kant condemns it. The only possibility of making sexual relation 
a relationship according to the principle of right is the warranty of the 
exclusive use of mutual sexual capacities.
After this first instinctive and natural level of love, one have a second 
one, which belongs to the category of affects, stormy and temporary 
feelings, which make difficult the reflection and deliberation on action. 
The love-affect must be distinguished from the love-passion, since 
passion, even if it is violent, may coexist with reason and it is deliberative 
in order to reach its purpose.” (Ant, AA 7:252). Kant metaphorically 
explains the differences between affect and passion:
Affect works upon the health like a stroke of apoplexy; passion works like 
consumption or atrophy, affect like an intoxicant which one has to sleep 
off, although it is still followed by a headache; but passion is looked upon 
as an illness having resulted from swallowing poison. (Ant, AA 7:252)
It can be seen here that love-affect differs from the love- passion 
regarding to the intensity, duration and degree of danger of each 
emotion. The first one is more intense, however it lasts less and he is 
less dangerous than passion. For this reason, Kant affirms that, where 
there is much affect, there is little passion, since stormy emotions are 
depleted quickly, and does not allow to the cold evaluation of the lived 
situation and the deliberation on reaching an end: “Affects are honorable 
and unconcealed, while passions are deceitful and hidden.” (Ant, 
M. de L. Borges – Kant on emotions and Williams’ criticism
  Veritas, v. 58, n. 1, jan./abr. 2013, p. 131-150  141AA 7:253). The innocence of the love-affect and its incapacity of 
controlling its manifestations can be evidenced in the following situation:
A serious lover is often restrained, awkward, und uncaptivating in the 
presence of his beloved. But he who only pretends to be madly in love, 
and who has no other talent, can play his role so naturally that he lures 
the poor, deceived maiden wholly into his snare, just because his heart 
is uninhibited and his head clear. (Ant, AA 6:264)
The love-affect resembles the feeling of falling in love for someone, 
denoting a romantic, uncontrollable love, whose manifestation can make 
the person blind to the defects of the objects of desire: “Whoever loves 
can keep his vision intact; but the person who is in love is inevitably 
blind to the mistakes of the beloved object, although the latter will 
usually regain his vision a week after the wedding.” (Ant, AA 7:253). 
The emotion of this passionate person is an affect, in Kantian terms. The 
term passion is reserved for more deliberative attitudes, being able to 
coexist with a cunning dissimulation, since this, as shown in the example 
above, can contribute to possess the object of desire. Therefore, Kant 
affirms that passions are not like affects; affects, at least, may coexist 
with a good intention, while passions reject any attempt of improvement. 
Such is the case when a person acts moved by a strong affect, what 
Kant characterizes as a weakness of the will. Passion, on the contrary, 
chooses a principle in accordance with inclination. The passion of love, 
however, possesses an advantage regarding other passions, such as 
ambition, vanity or greed, which are illnesses of the reason because they 
possess a permanent character, since, according to Kant, “they are never 
satisfied.” (Ant, AA 7:266). The passion of love, in contrast, ceases when 
the desire, or the physical love, is satisfied. If it is possible to go crazy 
due to obsession caused by other passions, such as ambition, vanity and 
greed, the saying one “got crazy because of love” contains something 
of implausible, therefore the one who goes crazy due to refusal of the 
loved being, was already disturbed to have chosen the wrong person as 
the object of his affect and desires. Such was the case, very common at 
the time of Kant, of people who fall in love for others of superior social 
level: “to get passionate themselves for a person of a higher social class 
and to wait of this the madness of a marriage it is not the cause, but the 
consequence of a previous disturbance.” (Ant, AA 7:217). This seems to 
have happened to Kant himself, when, in the years of 62/63 he falls in 
love with a student, who would marry someone richer and of a better 
social level then Kant’s.
Love, in the form of affect or passion, even in its most violent 
manifestation, is not as harmful as passions of ambition, vanity and greed. 
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love implies a feeling between dissimilar people. Or, Kant writes in one 
of the Reflexionen grouped in the Nachlass on Anthropology: “We need 
more to be honored what loved, but we also need something to love with 
who we are not in rivalry. Then we love birds, dogs or a young, fickle and 
darling person.” (R 1471, AA 15:649).
Apparently, this claim denounces a prejudice of the time regarding 
the feminine inferiority. However, in another Reflexion, Kant would affirm 
that “Men and women possess a reciprocal superiority one in relation 
to the other.” (R 1100, AA 15:490). Despite the fact that this superiority 
of each one is relative to different aspects, the reciprocal inequality is 
what stimulates and promotes the love as affect or passion. The fact that 
these feelings need a reciprocal moral inequality indicates that their loci 
are strange to morality, which consists of considering the other as equal 
and promoting its happiness.
The figures of love assume different positions in Kent’s philosophy, 
some have moral value, and others do not. The love as benevolence can 
be considered a practical principle; one to do good and to help people, 
from whom the love for the others can, also, be awaken. This was clear in 
the analysis of the Kantian text, where it is said that it is not necessary 
to love and due to this, to do good to human beings, but to act morally, 
and through this habit, to awake feelings of affect for human beings. The 
feeling of sympathy can also be used by the agent to stimulate moral 
actions in which the respect for the moral law was not strong enough 
as an incentive. This is not in opposition to what is explained in the 
Groundwork, in which the moral value of an action resides in the fact the 
respect for the law is the incentive for the action. To use the feeling of 
sympathy is only a provisional morality that, empirically, can and must 
use these feelings of pleasure and displeasure for the other people’s 
luck to encourage good actions, until our respect for the law is sufficient 
strong to be a possible incentive.
Relatively to affects and passions, even if both were criticized as 
illnesses of the reason, the negative effect of the love-affect was less 
dangerous than the persistence and inversion of principles in the love-
passion. However, since the passion of love ceases when its physical 
desire is satisfied, it does not have the persistence of other cultural 
passions. However, such feelings of love are not useful to morality; since 
the love-affect or love-passion is awaken from an idea of inequality alien 
to morality.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the analysis of affects 
and passions in the Doctrine of the Virtue and Anthropology does not 
contradict the spirit of the Groundwork, since the action with true moral 
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does not hinder us to use our sensible feelings, such as sympathy, for 
the purposes of reason. 
4  Could a mere thought move us to act?
In the book Kant and the historical turn, Karl Ameriks argues that 
Kantians should prove that moral law can move the agent to act, because 
action is not a matter of mere judgment. If one has an impulse to do 
something, this could not be a mere thought.8
If we take for granted that only desires and inclinations could move 
us to action, Kantians should explain themselves what kind of feeling 
moves the agent, or how can we act without feelings. As Ameriks 
himself stressed in an earlier work, “since the ground of duty is defined 
independently of all our natural inclination, it seems that Kantian morality 
leaves the very motivation of moral activity unexplainable.9 However, if 
we do not take for granted that one should act out of feelings, then we 
do not have to prove anything.
In fact, Kant does not take for granted that we need feelings in order to 
accomplish moral actions. On the contrary, tender feelings will only make 
the heart weaker and will not develop any virtue. Since virtue for Kant is 
fortitude, that is, strength, teaching tender feelings to young people will 
only build a weak character that cannot meet the demands of morality:
In our times, when one hopes to have more influence on the mind 
through melting, tender feelings or high-flown, puffed-up pretensions, 
which make the heart languid instead of strengthening it, than by a 
dry and earnest representation of duty, which is more suited to human 
imperfection and to progress in goodness, it is more necessary than ever 
to direct attention to this method. (KpV, AA 5: 157)
The method mentioned here is the moral education of young man. In 
order to really develop moral character in children, it is not useful to tell 
histories about magnanimous and noble actions. Is it worthwhile to call 
the attention to the holiness of duty alone. In pedagogical terms, this is 
more useful, because feelings do not develop character since they calm 
down and the organism tends to go back to its natural vital motion.
All feelings, especially those that are to produce unusual exertions, must 
accomplish their effect at the moment they are at their height and before   
8  Ameriks. “Kant and motivation externalism”. In: Klemme. Moralische motivation. 
Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2006b, p. 91. 
9  Ameriks, K. Kant and the fate of autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 
p. 310.
M. de L. Borges – Kant on emotions and Williams’ criticism
144  Veritas, v. 58, n. 1, jan./abr. 2013, p. 131-150they calm down; otherwise they accomplish nothing because the heart 
naturally returns to its natural moderate vital motion and accordingly 
falls back into the languor that was proper to it before, since something 
was applied that indeed stimulated it, but nothing that strengthened 
it. (KpV, AA 5: 158)
A possible objection from a sentimentalist would refer, not to the 
duration of the incentive, but to its force. Even if feelings cannot last 
for a long time, they give us more intense incentive to the moral action. 
Kant would not disagree with that, he would even give us an example of 
someone who tries with extreme danger to save people from a shipwreck, 
finally loosing their own life in the attempt. In this case, there is more 
“subjective moving force as an incentive if the action is represented as a 
noble and magnanimous one than if it is represented merely as a duty.” 
(KpV, AA 5:158). However, the incentive presented in the pure law of duty 
is the more elevated of all. Not only it is possible to act from the motive 
of duty alone, but it is as well desirable. 
5  What is wrong in acting morally out of emotions?
People usually make a portrait of Kant’s philosophy and the relation 
between action and emotion as if Kant has said that we know what to 
do, but sometimes, because of the weakness of the will, we can fail to 
accomplish to do the right thing. But is it always true? First, is it a good 
picture of human nature? Does Kant really say that? 
Here we have two different situations. First, we can act out of 
emotions that are commonly taken as anti-moral emotions, such as rage, 
envy, ambition, jealousy or greed. People taken by the strong emotion of 
rage not only have the tendency to fight against someone, but also think 
that revenge is the right thing to do. 
But we can also have emotions that lead us to moral actions, such as 
sympathy. Although Kant acknowledges that sympathy can be part of 
a morality faute de mieux, the benevolent action done out of sympathy 
does not have intrinsic moral value.
Kant has been criticized by many authors who support the view that 
acting from duty is repugnant. The anti-Kantian literature has illustrated 
this assumption with a well known example: the example of someone 
who visits his friend in the hospital out of duty. 
This example was first formulated by Stocker and discussed, among 
others, in Baron’s book Kantian Ethics almost without apology.10 Suppose   
10  Baron, M. Kantian Ethics almost without apology. New York: Cornell University Press, 
1995.
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his friend why he is visiting him, he answers that he is visiting his friend 
out of duty. This example is supposed to be a critique towards Kantian 
system, in which it is supposed that to be cold or insensible is a virtue. 
But is it really so? In fact, Kant is not concerned with what is more 
comfortable or warm in a psychological way, he is asking what the right 
thing to do is and what should be a right motive. Saying that the right 
motive is duty, Kant is not condemning warm feelings, but is only saying 
that we should visit our friends in the hospital even if we do not have 
any inclination to go to hospital. In fact, few people really like to go to 
hospitals. If going to the hospital should be dependent upon a feeling 
of friendship, compared to the bad feeling to enter a hospital, perhaps 
in the most of the cases, the feeling of sympathy for a friend will not be 
enough to contrabalance the feeling of avoiding a hospital. 
One of the main criticisms against the supposed coldness of Kantian 
morality has come from feminist philosophy. According to this critique, 
some ingredients that are important to female identity, such as emotion, 
love, empathy and cooperation, are not in consideration in Kantian Ethics. 
Sally Sedwick expresses this criticism when she says that “because 
of moral agency on Kantian view is a function of acting from reason 
rather then from feeling, it is said to reflect features more of male than 
of female identity.”11 She, however, supports Kant against the critique 
of a misunderstanding of human psychology. What Kant is saying is not 
that we are- or should be- cold people without any feeling or that in our 
meaningful relations feelings should not play an important part. What he 
is claiming is that empirical motives do not have moral weight. 
6  Only motivations motivate
Paul Guyer in a recent work offers a challenging version of Kant 
Philosophy.12 He acknowledges that Hume and Kant are two opposed 
view on moral matter. While for Hume reason cannot give a motive or end 
for action, only means for the realization of ends, Kant admits that pure 
reason can provide a sufficient motive. For Guyer, however, even if they 
are considered antagonists in moral matters, they share the internalist 
principle, according to which a principle can give us a motive to action:
Hume and Kant share the “internalist principle” that any genuine moral 
principle must be a motive for action: that principle is the premise for   
11  Schott, M. R. Feminist interpretations of Immanuel Kant. University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1997, p. 78.
12  Guyer, P . Knowledge, reason and taste: Kant‘s response to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
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principles, because he does not see how reason can be motivating, but 
it is equally the basis for Kant’s conviction that reason must be capable 
of producing a distinctive moral feeling, because he also assumes that 
some sort of what Hume would call an “affection” must be the proximate 
phenomenal or empirical cause of any action, and therefore infers that 
pure reason must produce a moral feeling that can in turn cause the 
action that reason requires.13
According to Guyer, the internalism in Kant is given by the fact that 
pure practical reason motivates us to act through feelings, such as respect 
for moral law or moral feeling. Guyer explains:
Although Kant’s Metaphysics could have allowed him to argue that 
pure practical reason sets moral ends and principles and determines us 
to act in accordance with them entirely independently of any feelings 
or desires, he does not do so, but instead supposes that pure practical 
reason motivate us to act precisely by creating a feeling, namely moral 
feeling or the feeling of respect for moral law, which can them move us 
to act.14
Guyer reconstructs Kant’s arguments in a way that indicates that 
feelings play the role of motivations, in Kant as well as in Hume, narrowing 
the difference between them. The feelings that could play the role of moral 
motives are not only respect or moral feelings, but sympathy as well. In 
this sense Kant would be an internalist, because pure practical reason 
will produce a feeling that will operate as a motivation in Hume’s sense. 
I will challenge this view in two aspects. First concerning the idea 
that Kant is an internalist; second, concerning Guyer position that moral 
feelings are the real motives for Kant.
7  Reasons and motives
The vocabulary of internal and eternal reasons was not used by Kant. 
Bernard Williams was the one, who brought these expressions to the 
philosophical vocabulary, 
According to Williams, the internalist view states that a reason is a 
motive, in the following sense: “A has a reason to φ only if he could reach 
the conclusion to φ by a sound deliberative route from the motivations 
he already has”. For the externalist, on the contrary, it can be true that 
A has a reason to φ even though A has no motivation in his motivational 
set that could lead him to φ:
13  Guyer. Knowledge, reason and taste: Kant‘s response to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008, p. 164-165.
14  Ibidem, p. 179.
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can be true of A that he has a reason to φ even though A has no motivation 
in his motivational set that could, either directly or by some extension 
through deliberation, lead him to φ.”15
The internalist presents the relation between explanatory and 
normative reasons. If it is true that A has a reason to φ, then it must be 
possible that he should φ for that reason-if he does act for that reason, 
then that reason will be the explanation of his acting. For the internalist, 
an explanatory reason (A has a reason to φ) is also a normative reason (It 
must be possible that A should φ for that reason). If he does act for that 
reason, then that reason will be the explanation of his acting. 
Williams cannot understand how an internalist can say someone has a 
reason that is not previously in his motivation set. He gives the following 
example. Someone tells his friend he has to be nicer to his wife ad the 
friend asks him why. Then follows the dialogue:
1.  You have a reason to be nicer to her
2.  What reason?
3.  Because she is your wife
4.  I don’t care. Don’t you understand? I really do not care.16
With this example, Williams shows that there is no sense in presenting 
a reason to someone who does not have that reason previously in her 
motivational set and that there is no sense in stating that the man should 
be nicer to her, if this was not in his motivational set:
There are many things I can say about or to this man: that he is 
ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard, sexist, nasty, selfish, brutal, and many 
other disadvantageous things. I shall presumably say, whatever else I 
say, that it would be better if he were nicer to her. There is one specific 
thing the external reasons theorists want me to say, that the man has a 
reason to be nicer.17
Although internalism was proposed to explain the human view of 
reasons as motivations, some Kantian scholars, such as Guyer, have tried 
to approximate Kantianism and internalism. 
However, the internalism theory, at least as Williams has presented 
it, is the opposite of Kantian idea of motivation, because man should 
already had in his motivational set the motive (or in Kant’s vocabulary, 
the incentive) to perform an action. Although Williams did not want to 
make such strong assumption, he recognizes that for many philosophers   
15  Williams, B. Making sense of humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 35.
16  Ibidem, p. 39.
17  Ibidem, p. 39.
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categorical imperative.18
In order o understand this claim, it is worth to translate the 
Kantian vocabulary into Williams one. What we translate by motive 
(Bewengsgrund) is, in fact, what Williams calls reason, and what we 
translate by incentive (Triebfeder) is what he calls motive. If we translate 
the internalist principle in Kantian terms, it will be: someone only has a 
motive if he already has an incentive. And this is exactly the opposite of 
what Kant wanted to say. For, an incentive can never be what pulls the 
action, unless it is a motive. 
Paul Guyer understands the Kantian theory of action as if the motive 
of the law produces its own incentive and this incentive is what really 
the pulls the moral action. However, in Kant we do not need a motivation 
to motivate. The mere though that something is right is sufficient to 
trigger the right action. A mere thought, or belief, is not a motivation in 
Williams’s sense. William claims that “Only motivations motivate” (which 
is considered the Hume’s axiom) is explained as following: if someone 
acts to further some desirable end, then his doing so must be explained 
by some disposition or desire that he already had; his so acting cannot 
be explained merely by the fact that it furthers that outcome or merely by 
his knowing that it does. It follows from this that if one wants people to 
pursue such outcomes, one will have to see that appropriate motivations 
do actually exist to produce that result. 
8  When Williams’s criticism is right and when it is wrong
In his criticism against Kant, Williams points out that Kant does 
not have a place for emotions and blames him for the suspicions moral 
philosophers have against emotions. In my view, the first criticism is 
wrong: Kant has a place for emotions, and even for moral emotions. 
He explores the role of emotions in the Metaphysics of Morals, when 
he analyses the role of sympathy and moral feeling. It is true that most 
emotions for Kant are considered bad for the tasks of morality, mainly 
affects such as anger or passions such as ambition, greed or vanity. It is 
even true that in some texts he says that we would like to get rid of all our 
inclinations or that affects and passions are sores of the reason. However, 
in the Metaphysics of Morals and in the Anthropology he acknowledges 
that some feelings can work as a morality faute de mieux. 
The second criticism, however, is right: that Kant could have been 
a strong influence on moral philosophers to despise emotions. Kant   
18  Williams, Bernard. Moral Luck .Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 106.
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morality which does not depend upon emotions. Emotions are fickle, 
they are dependent on aspects such as humour, or temperament, or even 
contingent facts of our daily lives, and consequently they cannot be a 
stable basis for morality. 
Williams is also right in pointing out that Kant does not attribute to 
emotions the role of moral incentive, and that the Kantian doctrine aims 
at proving that an action can be done without any empirical motivation. 
Williams, on the contrary, claims that a desire or a disposition should 
be present as an antecedent of any action. As a strong supporter 
of internalism, he holds that intentional action, even those which 
accomplishes moral ends, should be motivated by something else than 
mere beliefs, since beliefs alone do not motivate. This is surely a criticism 
against Kant, who supports the view that pure reason – without any help 
from emotions or desires – can be immediately practical.
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